Transaction monitoring · UK banks and payment firms
Every alert
shows its working.
Adept scores financial crime risk with rules your model risk team can read, and puts an AI analyst on top that cannot state a figure it has not fetched. Built for the moment when someone asks why the system flagged this account.
Why UK firms are re-tendering now
Receiving banks now carry half the cost of APP fraud. Liability is shared with the firm holding the money mule's account. PSR
Failure to prevent fraud carries an unlimited fine. The defence is reasonable procedures, which includes ongoing monitoring and review. ECCTA s199
Every figure on this page carries its source. That is the product's discipline, so it is the website's too. Our method
| Entity | Scenario | Value | Pts | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Bello Freight Ltd CUS-0021 | GEORISK Elevated-risk corridor | £248,411 | 20.0 | Critical |
Bran Marchetti CUS-0007 | MULERING Shared identifier ring | £61,204 | 26.0 | Critical |
Leyla Demir CUS-0008 | PASSTHRU Rapid pass-through | £54,880 | 18.4 | High |
Priya Raman CUS-0003 | STRUCT Cash structuring | £78,930 | 22.0 | Critical |
Owen Mensah CUS-0011 | CRYPTO Fan-in then off-ramp | £47,320 | 18.0 | High |
Hale Trading Ltd CUS-0024 | VELSPIKE Velocity against baseline | £112,000 | 12.0 | Medium |
Synthetic data. Every row opens to the transactions that produced it, and every point of the score to the scenario that raised it.
The UK position
Detection moved from a compliance cost to a balance sheet item.
Two changes in UK law did that. Neither is about having a monitoring system. Both are about being able to show that the one you have works.
Payment Systems Regulator
50 / 50You pay for the mule accounts you bank
Since 7 October 2024, reimbursing an APP fraud victim on Faster Payments is mandatory, capped at £85,000 per claim, due within five business days. The cost splits evenly between the sending firm and the receiving firm. The PSR is explicit that the receiving side is the firm banking the money mule. PSR PS24/7
Between October 2024 and June 2025, receiving firms reimbursed over £74m to sending firms. Only 67% paid inside the five day limit. PSR, Oct 2025
Mule ring detection is no longer a hygiene control. It is the line item.
Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act
UnlimitedFailure to prevent fraud, in force since 1 September 2025
A large organisation is criminally liable where an associated person commits a specified fraud offence intended to benefit it, unless the organisation proves it had reasonable fraud prevention procedures in place. Conviction carries an unlimited fine. ECCTA s199
The Home Office guidance names six principles for that defence. One is ongoing monitoring and review. It also warns that being regulated does not by itself make your existing compliance processes reasonable procedures. Home Office guidance
You will be asked to evidence that your monitoring is reviewed and tuned. In writing.
Note on scope: money laundering is not a base offence under the failure to prevent fraud regime. We cite it because it drives fraud prevention procedure, not because it extends to AML obligations, which sit under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 and JMLSG guidance.
The architecture
Two layers that never blur into each other.
Most vendors are bolting a language model onto a black box scoring engine and calling the result explainable. We separated the two, and the separation is enforced in the code, in the interface, and in what each layer is permitted to do.
The engine decides
Eleven configurable typology scenarios run over the ledger. Each contributes named points to an additive score, multiplied by the customer's KYC risk rating. The same data always produces the same score, and any point can be traced to the transactions that caused it.
- Reproducible. No sampling, no temperature, no drift
- Every point attributable to one named scenario
- Thresholds visible and versioned, not buried in weights
- Replays over historic data for back-testing
The AI analyst explains
A tool-using agent reads the case through eight logged functions. It cannot see the ledger any other way, cannot assign or revise a score, and cannot state a number it has not fetched. Every answer shows the lookups behind it.
- Structurally barred from scoring or deciding disclosure
- Grounded: no figure without a retrieved source
- Fixed answer schema, so output is scannable not chatty
- Full tool trace attached to every response
Why this matters commercially: when validation asks how the score was produced, you point at the rule. When an investigator asks what it means, they ask the analyst. Neither question contaminates the other, which is what makes the model reviewable.
Inside the console
Four things you will not find in a standard queue.
01 · Deterministic layer
A score you can take apart
Click any segment and you land on the transactions that produced those points. The arithmetic is shown, not implied: rule points, multiplied by the KYC risk rating, equals the score on the file.
This is the panel model risk functions ask for and rarely get. It turns the validation conversation from "explain the model" into "read the line".
Three accounts share one device and forward funds to a single collector within hours of receipt.
HighConsistent with a controlled mule network where two accounts feed a collector. Retention rate and timing are the strongest indicators.
02 · Assistive layer
Answers with a fixed shape and a visible trace
The analyst returns a structure, not a paragraph: the finding, the evidence with references back to real transactions, the reading, the innocent explanation, and what to do next. Investigators learn the shape once and then read it in seconds.
Expand the trace and you see every lookup the answer was built from. If a figure is not in the trace, the analyst was not permitted to say it.
03 · The unusual one
An assistant that argues against the alert
Every alert and every entity carries a button that asks the analyst to make the strongest case that this is a false positive. It uses the same data and the same grounding rules, pointed the other way.
Assistants built only to confirm the alert launder confirmation bias into something that reads like analysis. Given that a closed alert is a decision a regulator can review, an investigator needs the counter-argument on the file, not just the case for suspicion.
The geo-velocity firing is most likely a card-not-present transaction misread as travel.
Medium| Threshold | Alerts | Entities | Precision | Recall | F1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| £5,000 | 26 | 9 | 88.9% | 88.9% | 0.89 |
| £8,000 | 26 | 9 | 88.9% | 88.9% | 0.89 |
| £10,000 | 27 | 10 | 90.0% | 100.0% | 0.95 |
| £15,000 | 26 | 9 | 88.9% | 88.9% | 0.89 |
04 · Deterministic layer
Threshold changes come with evidence attached
Move one parameter and the console reports what it does to alert volume, precision and recall across the whole book. That output is the paper a tuning committee needs before it approves a change, produced in the tool rather than reconstructed afterwards in a spreadsheet.
In deployment the labels come from investigator dispositions and confirmed SAR outcomes, which is the only defensible basis for a production threshold.
Model your own numbers
What the receiving side is costing you
Set your figures. Nothing is sent anywhere, and nothing here is a claim about what Adept would deliver. The reduction slider is yours to set so you can decide what a change would need to be worth.
Celent puts the industry figure above 95%. We default lower so the output stays conservative. Celent
Reimbursement exposure applies the PSR's 50% receiving-side share to your claim volume, capping each claim at £85,000. PSR PS24/7 It excludes investigation cost, funds repatriated, claims declined for gross negligence, and the £100 excess. Treat it as an order of magnitude for a conversation, not a forecast.
For validation and audit
Built to be reviewed, not just to work.
The hardest meeting in a monitoring procurement is not with the fraud team. It is with model risk. Adept is designed around that meeting.
Reproducibility
The engine is deterministic. Re-run any historic period and you get the same alerts and the same scores. Scenario definitions and thresholds are versioned configuration, not embedded weights.
Attribution
No composite score exists without a decomposition. Every point maps to one named scenario and the transaction references that triggered it. There is no residual term.
Contained AI risk
The assistive layer has no write path to scores, dispositions or thresholds. Removing it entirely changes no alert and no score. That containment is what lets you adopt AI here without re-validating the detection model.
Tuning evidence
Threshold changes are proposed with before-and-after performance across the book, generated in the tool. That output is the artefact your committee minutes can reference and the ongoing monitoring and review your ECCTA defence needs.
What we do not claim
Performance figures shown anywhere on this site come from a labelled synthetic benchmark that ships with the product. We have no client deployments to cite yet, and we will not borrow someone else's numbers. Run it against your own data during evaluation and use those figures instead.
Questions we get early
Straight answers
Is this a rules engine or a machine learning model?
Rules today, deliberately. The detection layer is eleven deterministic typology scenarios with an additive, decomposable score. The roadmap adds an unsupervised anomaly layer over peer-group features and a supervised model trained on investigator dispositions, with the rule set retained underneath as an explainable floor. We would rather ship something a validation team can approve than something that demos better.
Where does the AI actually sit?
On top, reading only. It queries case data through eight logged functions and cannot see the ledger any other way. It has no write path to scores, thresholds or dispositions. Turn it off and every alert in your queue is identical.
What about data residency and customer data leaving our estate?
The detection engine runs in your environment and needs no external calls. The assistive layer calls a model API, so it is scoped to the case data required for the question and is the part to bring to your DPIA. UK deployments generally want that layer pinned to a UK or EU region, or run against a self-hosted model. Both are supported. This is the first thing to work through in evaluation, not the last.
How does it fit alongside our existing monitoring system?
Most firms start it in parallel rather than as a replacement. The engine consumes a transaction and customer feed and produces scored alerts with evidence, so it can run alongside an incumbent for a comparison period on the same data. That gives you a like-for-like precision and recall comparison rather than a vendor's benchmark.
Can the AI write our SARs?
It drafts, from evidence it has fetched, alongside a deterministic template so you can compare the two. It cannot decide a disclosure and it is not submittable output. An investigator verifies every figure, adds the relationship narrative, and the MLRO takes the decision. Any vendor telling you otherwise is selling you a problem.
What stage is the product at?
Early. The detection engine, console and assistive layer are built and working against a synthetic benchmark. We are looking for a small number of UK design partners to run it against real data under an evaluation agreement. If you need a system of record with a decade of deployments behind it, we are not that yet, and we will tell you so on the first call.
Design partner programme
See it run against your typologies.
A 45 minute technical walkthrough with your fraud, AML and model risk people in the room. We will run the engine live, take the console apart, and show you the parts that are not finished.
No sales sequence. One reply from the person who built it.
Prefer email? info@adeptfcd.co.uk